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NOTES
Constitutional Issues Raised by Diplomatic
Relations Between the United States
and the Holy See
In November 1983 the United States Congress initiated the estab-
lishment of de jure diplomatic relations' with the Holy See by repealing
the 1867 ban on appropriations for an official American Embassy in Pa-
pal Rome2 and by calling for the establishment of official diplomatic rela-
tions with the Holy See.3 Accordingly, President Reagan elevated his
personal representative to the Holy See, William A. Wilson, to the rank
of ambassador in early 1984.4 In June 1984 Congress approved appropri-
ations for the first American ambassadorial mission to the Holy See.5
The establishment of de jure diplomatic relations between the
United States and the Holy See raises constitutional questions concerning
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.6 Furthermore, Arti-
cle III of the United States Constitution complicates the adjudication of
the establishment clause issues by limiting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Standing and the political question doctrine are two Article III
hurdles that may bar a judicial determination of establishment clause
questions.7
1. For an explanation of the relationship between the Holy See, the Vatican and the
Catholic Church, see infra notes 12-31 and accompanying text. For a definition of de jure
relations, see infra note 37.
2. Act of Feb. 28, 1867, ch. 99, 14 Stat. 412, 413, repealed by Act of Nov. 22, 1983, Pub.
L. No. 98-164, § 134, 97 Stat. 1017, 1029. See also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
3. See H.R.J. Res. 316, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1757, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). See also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
4. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 22 (Jan. 10, 1984). See also infra note 46 and accom-
panying text. The Senate confirmed the nomination on March 7, 1987. 130 CONG. REC.
S2390, S2413 (Mar. 7, 1984). Mr. Wilson resigned on May 20, 1986, L.A. Times, May 21,
1986, § I, at 5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 21, 1986, at Al, col. 4, and President Reagan ap-
pointed Frank Shakespeare, former American ambassador to Portugal, to succeed him. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 1986, at 19, col. 6.
5. Reprogramming Funds for United States Mission to the Vatican: Hearing Before a Sub-
comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 22-23 (1984).
6. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend I.
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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The Establishment Clause represents an implicit call for government
neutrality towards religion. The Holy See, however, is a sovereignty
which serves a dual role as spiritual authority of the Catholic Church
and secular ruler of the Vatican City. This unique combination of reli-
gious and political roles raises two related establishment clause ques-
tions: (1) whether, by establishing de jure diplomatic relations with the
Holy See, the United States is recognizing a religion as well as a state;
and (2) whether this recognition violates the Establishment Clause.
The concept of justiciability embodied in the article III terms
"cases" and "controversies ' creates two distinct hurdles to judicial de-
termination of the establishment clause questions raised by de jure diplo-
rTatic recognition of the Holy See. First, under the doctrine of standing,
the court must determine whether a case presents establishment clause
issues in an adversarial context and whether these issues are capable of
resolution through the judicial process. 9 Second, under the political
question doctrine, the court must determine whether adjudication of es-
tablishment clause issues intrudes into areas constitutionally allocated to
other branches of the federal government."°
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan"
represents the first legal challenge to the constitutionality of establishing
de jure diplomatic relations with the Holy See. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarily dismissed the case for lack of
standing and the Supreme Court denied the petitioners a review or re-
hearing. Nonetheless, the constitutional issues arising from the actions
of Congress and the President deserve careful scrutiny.
This Note discusses the two major constitutional issues surrounding
the establishment of official diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Part
I presents a brief discussion of general background issues: (a) the nature
of the spiritual and secular sovereignty of the Holy See; (b) the history of
the diplomatic relations between the United States and the Holy See; and
(c) the constitutional mechanisms for granting de jure diplomatic recog-
nition to a foreign state. Part II analyzes two distinct constitutional is-
sues surrounding the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Holy
See: (a) the article III justiciability issues of standing and the political
question doctrine; and (b) the first amendment establishment clause is-
sues. This analysis ultimately concludes that the present diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States and the Holy See are constitutional.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
9. See infra notes 61-93 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
11. 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. American Baptist Churches v. Reagan,
107 S. Ct. 314, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 660 (1986).
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I. Background
A. The Nature of the Secular and Spiritual Sovereignty of the Holy See
The Holy See is a sovereign state with a worldwide spiritual mis-
sion. 2 Its dual nature arises from its position as the spiritual authority
over the worldwide Roman Catholic Church'" and as the secular sover-
eign over the Vatican City.' 4 For centuries the Church has voiced the
need for a secular domain to "assure the full autonomy of exercise of the
spiritual authority of the Holy See... which knows no frontiers ....
The minuscule autonomous territory of the Vatican City'6 gives a juridi-
cal personality to the entity of the Holy See which has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in a number of cases.'" The spiri-
tual authority of the Holy See, by contrast, extends throughout the world
to wherever members of the Church reside."8
As the head of the Holy See, the Pope serves a tripartite function as
Prophet, Priest and King. As Prophet, he is the preeminent interpreter
of Church doctrine. As Priest, he is the head of Catholic worship and
spiritual life, presiding over the Sacred College of Cardinals and all the
clergy of the Church. Finally, as King, the Pope serves as the monarch
of the Vatican City. 9
The spiritual and temporal influence of the Holy See fluctuated
throughout the centuries.2" At its inception during the Roman Empire,
12. R. GRAHAM, VATICAN DIPLOMACY-A STUDY OF CHURCH AND STATE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL PLAIN 219 (1959); J. LECLER, THE Two SOVEREIGNTIES: A STUDY OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 69 (1952);Williams, John Paul I's Concepts
of Church, State and Society, 24 J. CHURCH & STATE 463, 486 (1982); Note, Diplomatic Rela-
tions Between the United States and the Holy See: Another Brick from the Wall, 19 VAL. U.L.
REV. 197, 199 (1984).
13. Encyclical letter, Immortale Dei, of Pope Leo XIII (Nov. 1, 1886), partially reprinted
in R. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 218-19. The Roman Catholic Church hereinafter will be
referred to as the "Church".
14. Treaty of the Lateran, Feb. 11, 1929, Italy-Holy See, arts. II-IV, 1929 ACTA Apos-
TOLICA SEDIs 209, reprinted in 3. HEARLEY, POPE OR MUSSOLINI 221-33 (1929) [hereinafter
Treaty of the Lateran].
15. Address by Pope John Paul II to the Union of European Broadcasters (Apr. 3, 1981),
reprinted in Williams, supra note 12, at 486.
16. The Vatican City consists of 108 acres of sovereign, neutral, independent territory.
See Treaty of the Lateran, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 5, 7 (1929)
(Archbishop of the Phillipines held to be a juristic person subject to Phillipine court jurisdic-
tion); Santos v. Roman Catholic Church, 212 U.S. 463, 465 (1909) (legal personality of the
Holy See and its ability to possess property recognized by the Court); Municipality of Ponce v.
Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 324 (1908) (uridical existence of the Catholic Church,
the Holy See, and the Papacy recognized by the Court under international law).
18. See Note, supra note 12, at 199-200.
19. See Williams, supra note 12, at 486; Note, supra note 12, at 200.
20. See generally CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES-A COLLECTION OF
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES (S. Ehler and J. Morrall eds. 1954) [hereinafter
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the Church possessed virtually no temporal power.21 However, the
Church's temporal and spiritual powers gradually increased22 and
culminated in the establishment of the Papal States and the Holy Roman
Empire.23 From the fifteenth to the eighteenth century the secular influ-
ence of the Holy See gradually diminished24 until it reached its nadir in
the late nineteenth century with the annexation of the Papal States by
Italy.25
In return for the Holy See's renunciation of all territory previously
encompassed in the Papal States, the Lateran Treaty of February 11,
1929 created the Vatican City.26 The creation of the Vatican City pro-
vided the Holy See with an independent territorial base from which it is
able to conduct the spiritual affairs of the Church, free from the influence
of any secular power.27 However, the Holy See still exercises a strong
spiritual influence over many people and nations who share its spiritual,
peace-seeking teachings. As a secular diplomatic entity, the Vatican City
conveys the ideology of the Catholic Church to the world.2 8
EHLER & MORRALL]; N. EBERHARDT, A SUMMARY OF CATHOLIC HISTORY (1961); P.
HUGHES, A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1951); D. MEADOWS, A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1959); Bettwy, United States-Vatican Recognition:
Background and Issues, 29 CATH. LAW. 225, 227-234 (1984).
21. See D. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 3-33; Bettwy, supra note 20, at 228.
22. See D. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 64-68; Bettwy, supra note 20, at 228-29.
23. The Papal States were located in central Italy. They were comprised of modem Ro-
magna, Umbria, Rome and the Marches. Bettwy & Sheehan, United States Recognition Policy:
The State of Vatican City, 11 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 n.7 (1981). See also D. MEADOWS,
supra note 20, at 75-89; Bettwy, supra note 20, at 229.
24. In this period of absolutism and despotism, European secular rulers instituted a series
of anti-clerical reforms which separated church and state and subjugated the Holy See's secu-
lar power to that of the state. See D. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 90-120, 133-193; Bettwy,
supra note 20, at 229-30.
25. After the annexation of the Papal States by the newly unified Italian states in 1870, the
Holy See lost its secular autonomy and became dependent upon Italy. The "Roman Question"
arose when Pope Pius IX immured himself as the "prisoner of the Vatican" due to the loss of
the Holy See's territory. During this period, the Holy See's secular influence was at its lowest.
However, the Holy See continued to practice international diplomacy, and its spiritual influ-
ence remained powerful, especially in the Catholic Church's efforts for world peace. See D.
MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 201-04; Bettwy, supra note 20, at 231.
26. Treaty of the Lateran, supra note 14, art. II. See also D. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at
201-04; Bettwy, supra note 20, at 231.
27. See II N. EBERHARDT, supra note 20, at 691-92; Bettwy, supra note 20, at 231-32.
28. Bettwy, supra note 20, at 232, summarizes the international goals of the Holy See as
follows:
(1) religious freedom to act separately from and unhindered by affairs of nations
so that it may continue its spiritual missionary work within them; and
(2) recognition that it is an equal voice in the international community capable
of exercising spiritual [and moral] influence in the realm of international politics be-
tween and among nations.
See also EHLER & MORRALL, supra note 20, at 378-618; D. MEADOWS, supra note 20, at 216-
31.
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Despite the spiritual aspect of the Holy See, over one hundred secu-
lar governments in the international community recognize the Holy See
as a sovereign entity.29 However, the Holy See is unique in its spiritual
sovereignty over the Church.3" Territorial sovereignty provides the Holy
See with a diplomatic point of origin for pursuing its spiritual mission.31
B. History of United States-Holy See Relations
United States-Holy See relations may be divided into four catego-
ries: consular, non-reciprocal, unofficial, and full diplomatic.3 2 The
scope and intensity of relations between the United States and the Holy
See has varied considerably since 1797, when the United States first es-
tablished consular relations33 with the Papal States. The United States
maintained an uninterrupted consular presence in the Papal States until
their annexation by Italy in 1870.3' During this period of consular rela-
tions, the United States briefly conducted non-reciprocal formal relations
with the Papal States.3
In 1893, the Holy See sent its first apostolic delegate to Washington,
D.C. This non-diplomatic relationship with the United States continued
until 1984, when the apostolic mission was raised to ambassadorial status
29. Position Paper from the United States State Department, U.S.-Vatican Diplomatic Re-
lations: Talking Points 1 (Jan. 1984). See also 130 CONG. REc. 52387 (Mar. 7, 1984) (state-
ment of Sen. Lugar); Note, supra note 12, at 201; L.A. Times, June 15, 1987, at 6, col. I.
30. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text; see also 130 CONG. REc. S2384-90
(Mar. 7, 1984).
31. Bettwy, supra note 20, at 234.
32. Id. at 240-44.
33. Consular relations consist of commercial non-diplomatic relations conducted by
agents, designated as consuls, who are usually citizens of the host country. See L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 302-03 (2d ed. 1967); Bettwy, supra note 20, at 241; Note,
supra note 12, at 205.
34. The United States had consular relations with the Papal States because no unified
Italian nation existed at that time. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. The Papal
States maintained a consular presence in the United States from 1826 until the death of the
papal consul general in 1895. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 273-80 (1950); Bettwy, supra note 20, at 241.
35. In 1847, President Polk requested that Congress authorize formal diplomatic relations
with the Papal States by appropriating funds for a charg d'affaires (a diplomatic representa-
tive of inferior rank to an ambassador). The Senate initially debated the constitutionality of
appropriating the funds, but eventually agreed that some form of diplomatic relations with the
Holy See would be advantageous to the United States, despite significant anti-Catholic senti-
ment. The Papal States never established reciprocal relations and the United States terminated
its chargd d'affaires twenty years later due to disintegrating relations with Pope Pius IX. See
generally Act of Feb. 28, 1867, ch. 99, 14 Stat. 412, 413, repealed by Act of Oct. 20, 1983, Pub.
L. No. 98-164, § 134, 97 Stat. 1017, 1029; CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 477 (1848); R.
GRAHAM, supra note 13, at 82-84; L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, at 303-04; A. STOKES & L.
PFEFFER, supra note 34, at 273-74; Bettwy, supra note 20, at 245-46; Note, supra note 12, at
205-06.
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by the arrival of the Holy See's pro-nuncio.36 Congress accorded the
Holy See de facto recognition forty-five years later. 7 In the following
year, the United States reciprocated the Holy See's unofficial representa-
tion when President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent Myron C. Taylor as his
"personal representative with the rank of ambassador" to Pope Pius
XII.38
Mr. Taylor was sent as the President's personal representative to the
Pope and not as an official diplomat to the Holy See.39 Thus, President
Roosevelt was able to retain the benefits of having diplomatic channels
with the Holy See while circumventing an establishment clause
analysis.4°
Strong political pressure and public opposition have precluded the
establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Holy See since 1847,
when Congress first considered and rejected establishing full diplomatic
relations, choosing instead to send a charge d'affaires.1 In 1951, Presi-
dent Truman attempted to name Mark C. Clark as an ambassador to the
Holy See, but Congress refused to comply.4" Despite pressure by his staff
36. An apostolic delegate is a non-diplomatic representative of the Holy See. Apro-nun-
co is the Holy See's highest ranking diplomatic representative, equivalent to an American
ambassador. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan, 607 F.
Supp. 747, 750 (D.C. Pa. 1985); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 34, at 276; Bettwy,
supra note 20, at 242.
37. De facto recognition refers to a type of recognition which is offered for practical pur-
poses, but which is not in total compliance with the law. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 375 (5th
ed. 1979). De jure recognition refers to legitimate diplomatic relations in total compliance
with the law. Id. at 382. See also Bettwy, supra note 20, at 242. De facto recognition of the
Holy See occurred when Congress passed a law, which remains in force today, confirming the
validation of official records of the Vatican City. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 682, 52 Stat. 1163
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4222 (1982)).
38. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII (Dec. 23, 1939), re-
printed in WARTIME CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND POPE PIUS
XII 17 (1947).
39. See 1 DEP'T ST. BULL. 711-12 (1939).
40. The idea of informally recognizing the Holy See was not original to President
Roosevelt. Many sovereigns had used similar forms of recognition throughout history. R.
GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 330. The Holy See accepted the President's personal representa-
tive, but did not grant Mr. Taylor the same status it accorded de jure diplomats from other
countries, to discourage other countries from initiating such de facto relations with the Holy
See. President Harry S. Truman retained Mr. Taylor as his personal representative to the
Holy See, despite domestic opposition, until he terminated the mission in 1950. Lyndon B.
Johnson resumed the practice in 1966 and all subsequent presidents have utilized this formula
for communicating with the Holy See. See R. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 326-34; L. PFEFFER,
supra note 33, at 307-08; A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 34, at 276-79; Bettwy, supra
note 20, at 243; Note, supra note 12, at 207-09.
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. In 1951, President Truman, in response to a perceived Communist threat, attempted
to transform the American government's de facto recognition of the Holy See to de jure recog-
nition by appointing an official ambassador to the Holy See. The President submitted General
Mark C. Clark for appointment as the first full-ranking ambassador to the Holy See, pressur-
[Vol. 15:101
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to establish full diplomatic relations, President Eisenhower disfavored
the idea because of the public opposition following the nomination of
Mark C. Clark.43 President Richard M. Nixon also considered establish-
ing full diplomatic relations, but instead sent a personal representative to
avoid a battle with Congress and the public.'
On November 22, 1983, Congress repealed the 1867 ban on appro-
priations for an American delegation in papal Rome, indicating for the
first time a Congressional willingness to establish full diplomatic rela-
tions with the Holy See.45 President Reagan then elevated his personal
representative to the rank of ambassador.46 In response, the Holy See
transformed its non-diplomatic apostolic delegation in Washington, D.C.
to an embassy for apro-nuncio. For the first time in history reciprocal de
jure diplomatic relations existed between the Holy See and the United
States.
C. The Constitutional Mechanisms for Granting De Jure Recognition to
a Foreign State
The power to recognize foreign governments and to appoint and re-
ceive ambassadors rests with the President.47 However, the President's
ing the Senate to approve Clark's nomination before an imminent recess. The nomination was
not confirmed before the Senate adjourned and religious groups mounted an extensive and
effective campaign against the nomination. President Truman eventually succumbed to the
anti-Catholic pressure and withdrew the appointment. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, at 308-
09; A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 34, at 278-79; Note, supra note 12, at 208-09. For a
discussion of the interrelation between the fight against communism and diplomatic relations
with the Holy See, see infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
43. See U.S.-Vatican Diplomatic Link Favored, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1954, at 7, col. 1;
Vatican Envoy Idea Attacked by Baptists, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1954, at 48, col. 2.
44. See US. Rules Out Vatican Envoy, But Plans Ties, Wash. Post, July 4, 1969, at 1, col.
1.
45. Act of Nov. 22, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 134, 97 Stat. 1017, 1029. A bill was
introduced in each house of Congress. The Senate bill was postponed. The House bill was
passed in lieu of it and signed into law by President Reagan on November 22, 1983. See S.
1342, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R. 2915, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 19 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1614 (1983). Both the House and the Senate called for establishment of diplo-
matic relations with the Holy See. See H.R.J. Res. 316, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1757,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
46. After much discussion of the implications of such an action on the doctrine of separa-
tion of church and state, but little real resistance, the Senate confirmed the nomination on
March 7, 1984. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 22 (1984). Congress approved appropriations
for an ambassadorial mission on June 20, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. S2390, 52413 (Mar. 7, 1984)
(Senate confirmation by 81 to 13 vote). See also 130 CONG. REC. S2384-90 (Mar. 7, 1984)
(related debate); Nomination of William A. Wilson: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1984); Reprogramming Funds for United States Mis-
sion to the Vatican: Hearing Before a Subcomm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13,
22-23 (1984).
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, & § 3. As is evident from a review of United States-
Holy See relations, Presidents historically have exercised the power to recognize foreign gov-
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foreign affairs power is not absolute. The same article of the Constitution
that grants the President the power to appoint ambassadors subjects that
power to the advice and consent of the Senate.48 Until recently the Sen-
ate refused to support the occasional presidential appointments of official
ambassadors to the Holy See.4 9
Once the Senate approves the President's choice of ambassador the
entire Congress determines what appropriation, if any, should be made
for the establishment of a mission at the Holy See. The Taxing and
Spending Clause5° provides Congress with the power to appropriate
funds, and the Necessary and Proper Clause5' provides the means by
which Congress can carry out such an appropriation.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment limits both the
President's foreign affairs powers and the Legislature's confirmation and
appointment powers by prohibiting governmental support of a religion. 2
Until recently Congress invoked the Establishment Clause to prohibit of-
ficial diplomatic relations with the Holy See.53
II. Constitutional Issues Raised by the Establishment of De
Jure Diplomatic Relations with the Holy See
A. Article III Issues: Standing and the Political Question Doctrine
Article III of the United States Constitution defines and limits the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hearing specific cases and controver-
sies.54 This definition of the judiciary's scope of power raises two proce-
dural barriers to obtaining an establishment clause analysis from the
Supreme Court. The concept of justiciability, embodied in the terms
"cases" and "controversies," encompasses the two separate doctrines of
standing and political questions:
In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process [standing doc-
trine]. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judi-
ciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal
courts will not intrude into areas committed to other branches of
government [political question doctrine].55
ernments and receive ambassadors for a particular reason of foreign policy, international rela-
tions or political circumstances. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
49. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § , cl. 1.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
55. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1967).
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Inherent in the Article III concept of standing is the requirement
that the plaintiff "allege ... a personal stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy."56 Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered
"some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal
action . . . "" before the court can consider the merits of the case.
In its review of Americans United for Separation of Church and State
v. Reagan,5" the Third Circuit dismissed the petitioners' complaint, hold-
ing that the case was not justiciable. Writing for the court, Judge Gib-
bons held that the petitioners lacked standing to sue. Moreover, even if
petitioners had established standing, the political question doctrine
would bar the court from hearing the case.5 9 This holding denied the
petitioners an adjudication based on the merits. The Supreme Court de-
nied the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari review and rehearing.6"
1. Standing
The plaintiffs in Americans United asserted standing to sue in three
capacities: as taxpayers, as citizens and voters, and as victims of stigma-
tization.61 The Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs lacked "a sufficient
protectable interest" as either taxpayers or citizens and that the injuries
alleged by the plaintiffs were not "direct and palpable" and therefore
were insufficient to establish standing as victims of stigmatization.62
a. Taxpayer Standing
Suits by citizens predicated upon the ideological right of every citi-
zen to challenge government violations of the Constitution are generally
prohibited.63 In 1923, the Supreme Court refused to recognize that a suit
by a taxpayer fell under an exception to this general ban.64 The Court
56. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1961).
57. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1974); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-54
(1970).
58. 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. American Baptist Churches v. Reagan,
107 S. Ct. 314, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 660 (1986).
59. Id. at 202.
60. American Baptist Churches v. Reagan, 107 S. Ct. 314, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 660
(1986).
61. 786 F.2d at 198. The plaintiffs consisted of 20 religious organizations, twelve officials
of those organizations, and seventy-one individual clergy of various denominations. Id. at 195.
62. Id. at 200, 201.
63. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1981); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-17 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.
1, 11-14 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (per curiam); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S.
126, 129-30 (1922). See also infra text accompanying note 65.
64. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 475 (1923); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923). These cases involved two challenges to the Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat.
224, one by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the other by an individual named Froth-
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found that a federal taxpayer's interest in the moneys of the treasury,
when compared with the combined interest of all other federal taxpayers,
was too "minute and indeterminable" to constitute sufficient injury to
confer standing.65
The Warren Court created a narrow exception to the traditional
standing rules in the 1968 case of Flast v. Cohen.66 In Flast, the Court
granted standing to citizens challenging federal expenditures on the basis
of their status as taxpayers. The majority in Flast announced a "logical
nexus" test, which links the status of the taxpayer to the type of enact-
ment challenged. Under the logical nexus test, the taxpayer must estab-
lish two interconnections: "First, the taxpayer must establish a logical
link between [taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment at-
tacked .... Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between [tax-
payer] status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged."67 The Court explicitly restricted standing under the first re-
quirement to challenges against exercises of congressional power under
the Taxing and Spending Clause of article I, section 8 of the Constitu-
tion. Standing under the second requirement was restricted to actions
that allegedly violate specific limitations on the taxing and spending
power.68
In denying the plaintiffs standing as taxpayers in Americans United,
the Third Circuit focused on the strict taxing and spending clause limita-
tion set forth in Flast 9 Without explanation, Circuit Judge Gibbons
categorized "the general appropriations bill that authorize[d] support for
foreign missions" 70 as an exercise of congressional power under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause71 and not the Taxing and Spending Clause.72
ingham. The individual plaintiff claimed that the Act's enactment would result in increased
taxation, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving her of her property with-
out due process of law. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 477.
65. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 487.
66. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The plaintiffs in Flast challenged federal expenditures for instruc-
tors' salaries and educational materials in religious schools under the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (current version at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 2711-2854), alleging that such expenditures violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment and caused the plaintiffs to suffer as taxpayers. 392 U.S. at 103.
67. 392 U.S. at 102.
68. Id. at 102-03. In regard to the test's first requirement, the Court unequivocally stated
that "a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of
congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 102. The Court further stated: "It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental
expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute." Id. at 102.
See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1981).
69. Americans United, 786 F.2d at 198-200.
70. Id. at 199.
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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The presidential appointment of an ambassador to the Holy See, the
senatorial confirmation of the ambassador, and the congressional repeal
of the 1867 prohibition against maintaining a mission at the Holy See are
not spending enactments. Therefore, these acts cannot be challenged in a
taxpayer suit. However, the congressional power to appropriate funds
for an ambassadorial mission, like other congressional appropriations, is
an exercise of the congressional power "to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."' 73 The
Necessary and Proper Clause is only the instrument by which Congress
carries out its taxing and spending clause and other enumerated
powers.74
The plaintiffs in Americans United did not specifically allege that the
appropriation of funds for a mission to the Holy See was a violation of
the Taxing and Spending Clause.75 This oversight by the plaintiffs ap-
pears to be the only rational explanation for Circuit Judge Gibbons' nec-
essary and proper clause categorization of Congress' actions, since the
plaintiffs did in fact meet the first Flast requirement.
The second prong of the Flast logical nexus test requires that the
plaintiffs establish a nexus between their status as taxpayers and the pre-
cise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.76 The Americans
United plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a congressional exer-
cise of the taxing and spending power which allegedly violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. The Supreme Court held in Flast that the
Establishment Clause "operates as a specific constitutional limitation
upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power."' 77 The
plaintiff-taxpayers in Americans United thus satisfied the second nexus
requirement of the Flast test as well as the first, and should not have been
denied standing as taxpayers.78
b. Citizenship Standing
Justice Fortas, concurring in Flast, suggested that citizenship alone
might be sufficient to confer standing for a challenged violation of the
Establishment Clause.79 "Perhaps the vital interest of a citizen in the
establishment issue, without reference to his taxpayer's status, would be
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Some commentators have anticipated that a suit chal-
lenging the establishment of official diplomatic relations with the Holy See would fall well
within the taxing and spending clause confines set forth in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
See Bettwy, supra note 20, at 261; Bettwy & Sheehan, supra note 23, at 11-12.
74. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
75. 786 F.2d at 199.
76. 392 U.S. at 102. See also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
77. Flast, 392 U.S. at 104. See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 497 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. 392 U.S. at 102-03.
79. 392 U.S. at 115-16 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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acceptable as a basis for this challenge."8 Justice Douglas advocated a
similar view in his concurring opinion in Flast, suggesting that taxpayers
could serve as "vigilant private attorneys general" protecting the people
from various constitutional violations.81
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, distinguished the status of the plain-
tiffs, who sought to complain "not as taxpayers, but as 'private attorneys-
general,'" from the traditional plaintiffs, who represent their own per-
sonal and proprietary interests.82 The majority accepted Harlan's nar-
row definition, arguing that an all-encompassing definition of citizenship
standing, while highly altruistic, would open the floodgates to the plain-
tiff who "seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his
generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation
of power in the Federal System."83
The plaintiffs in Americans United asserted standing as citizens and
voters; 84 nonetheless they lacked the personal and proprietary interests of
the traditional taxpayer plaintiff required by the Flast majority. A gen-
eral representation of the public's interest by itself does not support the
plaintiffs' claim of citizenship standing.
c. Standing as Victims of Stigmatization
The Supreme Court has recognized that non-economic injuries, such
as stigmatization, can be a basis for demanding legal redress. However,
stigmatizing injuries provide standing only to those persons who are
"personally denied equal treatment" by the challenged discriminatory
conduct.8 5 Moreover, standing is allowed only when stigmatization is
likely to be relieved by a decision in the plaintiff's favor."
Circuit Judge Gibbons summarized the alleged stigmatization of the
plaintiffs in Americans United as: (1) the plaintiffs' deprivation of the
benefits of diplomatic recognition enjoyed by the Holy See; and (2) the
adverse light in which the plaintiffs are cast because they cannot enjoy
80. Id. at 115-16 (Fortas, J., concurring). But see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 488.
81. 392 U.S. at 107-14 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 119 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan characterized a "private attorne[y]
general" as a plaintiff who represents the public's interest in an acto popolaris, act of the peo-
ple. Id. at 119 n. 5. See also Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 632 (2d Cir. 1953); Associated
Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); P.
VAN DIJK, JUDICIAL REVIEV OF GOVERNMENT ACTION AND THE REQUIREMENT OF AN
INTEREST TO SUE 212-23 (1980).
83. Flast, 392 U.S. at 106. While the majority accepted Justice Harlan's narrow defini-
tion, it rejected his strict adherence to Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
84. 786 F.2d at 198.
85. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984). See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 755 (1984).
86. See Heckler, 465 U.S. at 738; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1981); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-42 (1976).
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such benefits.17 The Court of Appeals found an "absence of any causal
connection between [the plaintiffs' allegations of stigmatization] and the
challenged governmental action." Further, the "direct and palpable inju-
ries" alleged by the plaintiffs were not legally sufficient to establish stand-
ing as victims of stigmatization.88
The Court acknowledged that the Holy See might enjoy certain dip-
lomatic benefits invaluable to non-Catholic religious groups. However, it
found that those benefits were only available to the Holy See because,
unlike the plaintiffs, the Vatican exercises sovereignty over a small geo-
graphic area.89 Thus, the court did not truly analyze whether the plain-
tiffs had suffered direct and palpable injuries or whether those injuries
were causally connected to possible establishment clause violations by
the federal government. Finally, Judge Gibbons did not consider
whether the alleged stigmatization would be likely to be relieved by a
decision in the plaintiffs' favor.
Judge Gibbons may have denied the plaintiffs standing because they
were not "personally denied equal treatment"9 by the establishment of
de jure diplomatic relations with the Holy See.9" Specific religious lead-
ers or organizations who have actually suffered injuries due to the estab-
lishment of de jure relations between the United States and the Holy See
would present a stronger argument for personal denial of equal treatment
than the public interest group "Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State." The petition for certiorari review of the Third Cir-
cuit's decision was brought under the name of American Baptist
Churches v. Reagan.92 The decision of the plaintiffs to change their name
may reflect an effort to allege a more personalized injury.
In summary, the plaintiffs in Americans United were properly de-
nied standing simply as citizens and as victims of stigmatization. How-
ever, they were improperly denied standing as taxpayers under the
logical nexus test articulated by the Supreme Court in Flast.93
2. The Political Question Doctrine
Once standing is established, a federal court considers whether judi-
cial review of the issues presented would be proper under the political
87. 786 F.2d at 200. The benefits of diplomatic recognition may be summarized as (1)
access to the President through diplomatic channels; (2) the influence diplomatic relations
would afford the American government over the affairs of the Holy See and vice versa; and (3)
the advantage to the Church in the religious marketplace created by diplomatic relations with
the United States. Id. at 197-98.
88. Id. at 200-01.
89. Id. at 201.
90. Heckler, 465 U.S. at 740 (emphasis added).
91. See 786 F.2d at 201.
92. 107 S. Ct. 314 (1986).
93. See supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
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question doctrine. Under this doctrine, the federal judiciary defines its
distinct role as the adjudicative branch of the government and ensures
that it does not intrude on areas constitutionally committed to the polit-
ical branches of the government.94 The Court of Appeals in Americans
United held that the political question doctrine would be an insurmount-
able barrier to an adjudication of the plaintiffs' establishment clause
claims even if they were to establish standing.95
In the 1962 decision of Baker v. Carr,96 Justice Brennan set forth a
series of factors which would render an issue nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine. In general terms, a federal court cannot hear
a matter: (1) that the Constitution has explicitly committed to another
branch of government; (2) that lacks judicially manageable standards for
resolution; or (3) that requires a single voiced statement of the govern-
ment's view.
97
Recognition of foreign governments has long been considered a
power that the Constitution has committed to the President conditioned
upon the advice and consent of the Senate. Thus, judicial determination
of the propriety of such recognition is prohibited by the political question
doctrine.98 In addressing the Court's power to review the recognition of a
foreign country in Baker, however, Justice Brennan stated in dicta that
the doctrine does not preclude courts from examining "the resulting sta-
tus [of diplomatic recognition] and decid[ing] independently whether a
statute applies to that area."9 9 Thus, alleged violations of statutes and,
presumably, violations of the Bill of Rights resulting from diplomatic
recognition are reviewable, although the recognition itself is not. Apply-
ing Justice Brennan's reasoning, judicial review of the issue of whether
the United States is recognizing a spiritual as well as a secular entity is
distinguishable from nonjusticiable review of the recognition of a foreign
state where "the judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which
nation has sovereignty over a disputed territory ... 1,'00
There are judicially manageable standards for review of the estab-
lishment of de jure relations with the Holy See. The Court has reviewed
the juridical status of the Holy See in a variety of circumstances.' ° ' For
94. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
95. 786 F.2d at 201-02.
96. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
97. Id. at 217.
98. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, & § 3; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 212, 217
(dicta); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n.43 (1969).
99. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212.
100. Id. See also Bettwy, supra note 20, at 262.
101. See supra note 17; see also Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 987 (1981) (distinguishing the religious from the diplomatic func-
tions of the Pope); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (recognizing the Pope as
the head of the theocratic, independent, secular state of the Holy See).
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example, in Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia "2 the Third Circuit used the
three-pronged establishment clause test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man ' 03 to determine which of Philadelphia's expenditures during the
Pope's visit to the city violated the Establishment Clause.10 4 The District
of Columbia Circuit also employed the Lemon test when it recognized
the Pope as the head of the theocratic secular state of the Holy See in
analyzing the papal visit to Washington, D.C. in 1978.105 The Lemon
test is routinely used by federal courts and, therefore, provides judicially
manageable standards that should have been applied to the facts of
Americans United.
Finally, the establishment of de jure diplomatic relations with the
Holy See is not a matter that requires a single voiced statement of the
government's view. Generally, a matter requires a single-voiced state-
ment of the government's views if: (1) the matter is one of national se-
curity or policy;10 6 or (2) a judicial decision reversing the matter would
require the political equivalent of "unscrambling an egg."' 0 7 The United
States de jure recognition of the Holy See does not involve a matter of
national defense.' 8 Furthermore, the United States' checkered history
with the Holy See shows that it has become adept at offering and revok-
ing all forms of diplomatic recognition'0 9 and so would not have to "un-
scramble an egg" if the federal government's position were reversed.
The Supreme Court's denial of review and rehearing in Americans
United "° offers future plaintiffs little, if any, guidance for resolving the
justiciability and establishment clause issues surrounding the establish-
ment of de jure relations with the Holy See. However, nonjusticiability
does not imply constitutionality. Although the Supreme Court is the fi-
nal interpreter of the Constitution,"' each branch of the federal govern-
ment is bound by the limits imposed by the Constitution." 2 Thus, the
executive and legislative branches must consider the constitutionality of
their actions by applying the case law requirements of the Establishment
102. 637 F.2d 924, 929 (3d Cir. 1980).
103. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also infra notes 121-137 and accompanying text.
104. Gilflan, 637 F.2d at 929 (citing Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 480 F. Supp. 1161
(E.D. Pa. 1979)).
105. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
106. Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (establishment clause challenge to
United States military aid to Israel held to be nonjusticiable); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (challenge to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's prohibition
of arms sales to Bolivia held to be nonjusticiable).
107. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, vacating 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), (challenge
to President Carter's termination of defense treaty with Taiwan found to be nonjusticiable).
108. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. American Baptist Churches v. Reagan, 106 S. Ct. 314, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 660
(1986).
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
112. Id. at 180. See also L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, at 317.
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Clause."I3 Adherence to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution becomes especially critical when the government action in-
volved is likely to be nonjusticiable. When a court is unlikely to review a
government action, there is a greater danger of infringement upon consti-
tutional rights without adequate remedy.114
B. The Establishment Clause
The doctrine of separation of church and state is a highly controver-
sial and revered principle of American government. 5 The Framers of
the Constitution drafted the First Amendment partly in an effort to pre-
vent the creation of a national church and to protect the newly formed
government from the evils of religious war and persecution.'1 6 With the
proclamation that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establish-
ment of religion... ,"117 a "wall of separation ' 18 was erected between
church and state.
The meaning of the metaphorical wall of separation created by the
Establishment Clause has been subject to varied interpretations through-
out history. Some commentators advocate a complete separation theory
which would forbid any and all interference with religion by the govern-
ment.'1 9 At the other end of the spectrum, some commentators favor a
narrow construction of the First Amendment which would forbid only
the establishment of an official national religion.1 20
1. Challenging Government Actions Under the Establishment Clause
a. The Lemon v. Kurtzman "Neutrality" Test
In an effort to accommodate both extremes of the spectrum, the
113. 130 CONG. REC. 52387 (Mar. 7, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Lugar). See also 130 CONG.
REC. S2386 (Mar. 7, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
114. Howe, Diplomacy, Religion and the Constitution, NATION 29 (Jan. 12, 1952).
115. John Locke's enlightenment theory that religion exists outside the jurisdiction of the
civil government, J. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 17-20 (1955), was so
widely accepted in Colonial America as to be deemed a "self-evident" truth by the Drafters of
the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Locke's theory, when combined with the multiplicity of religious sects and the movement
away from religious worship at that time, had a profound influence on the American solution
to the Church-State problem. L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, at 101-03. While an express guaran-
tee of religious freedom was not included in the original draft of the Constitution, it was im-
portant enough to the several states to become a condition to its ratification. L. PFEFFER,
supra note 33, at 125.
116. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); A. STOKES & L. PFEF-
FER, supra note 34, at 91, 93-94.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
118. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association
of Connecticut, reprinted in S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943).
119. See generally L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, 149-54.
120. Id.
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Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman 121 developed a neutrality test
122
to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated. The
test consists of three prongs: first, whether the law in question has a valid
secular purpose; 123 second, whether its primary effect advances or inhib-
its religion;1 24 and third, whether it creates excessive entanglement be-
tween church and state.125 A government action violates the
Establishment Clause if it fails any one of the three prongs.26
Any government aid to or interference with religion must have a
valid secular purpose to pass the first prong of the Lemon 127 test. As
long as the government action has at least one secular purpose, it does
not violate the first prong, even if the action has an incidental religious
purpose.' 2 8 Very few decisions have found a valid secular purpose to be
lacking in government action.' 29
The second prong focuses on the primary effect of a government
action by inquiring whether the action advances or inhibits religion.
1 30
This prong was designed to discern those government actions which meet
the lax primary secular purpose test of the first prong, but which have the
121. 403 U.S. 602, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
122. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-20 (challenge to public salary support for parochial school
teachers). The Supreme Court drew from a series of earlier decisions to develop the three
prongs necessary to determine whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause.
See infra notes 123-125.
123. 403 U.S. at 612. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947), the
Court articulated the first of the three tests when it looked to the "purpose and primary effect"
of publicly funded busing to parochial schools. The Court later used this functional purpose
and primary effect test to analyze a challenge to Sunday Closing ("Blue") Laws in McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961).
124. 403 U.S. at 612. The second prong was first used by the Court in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1968), where an ordinance requiring Bible
study in public schools was iound to be unconstitutional because its primary effect was to
advance religion. The Court later held that a government activity, e.g. military draft, may be
constitutional even if it affects particular religious beliefs, if its primary impact on religion is
generally neutral. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
125. 403 U.S. at 613. The third prong, excessive entanglement, first appeared in Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), where the Court questioned the effect a state property tax
exemption for religious, educational and charitable institutions would have on the involvement
of the government in religious matters.
126. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Reagan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
127. 403 U.S. at 612-20.
128. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday Closing ("Blue") Laws had a
valid secular purpose of allowing citizens a day of rest and only an incidental religious effect).
129. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Kentucky statute requiring the posting
in public school classrooms of privately purchased copies of the Ten Commandments had no
valid secular purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (Arkansas statute prohibit-
ing public school teachers from teaching the theory of evolution had no valid secular purpose).
130. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (state property tax exemption for
religious, educational, and charitable institutions does not primarily advance or inhibit
religion).
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practical primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion."'
Finally, under the third prong of the Lemon test the court must
inquire into the degree of contact between a particular religion and the
state. The Court has used several factors to determine whether excessive
entanglement exists between church and state. 132 An inference of exces-
sive entanglement will arise if: (1) the institution with which the govern-
ment interacts is by its nature pervasively religious; 133 (2) the nature of
the government action requires administrative entanglement between
church and state;13 1 (3) the nature of the resulting relationship between
the government and the institution requires continuing official surveil-
lance;135 and (4) the government action creates potential political divi-
siveness along religious lines. 136 These four factors must be considered
together in deciding whether a government action creates excessive en-
tanglement; any single factor alone is insufficient for invalidation.
131
b. The Historical Tradition Test
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has not consistently applied the
Lemon three-prong test. Although the Court in many cases has followed
the Lemon test, 138 an analysis of its recent decisions reveals significant
deviations. For example, in Marsh v. Chambers 139 Chief Justice Burger
relied on a historical tradition test rather than on the three prongs of
Lemon to determine whether the Establishment Clause had been vio-
lated. In Marsh, the Court gave great weight to the traditional nature of
the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening each day with a prayer by
a chaplain, approving the practice without discussing the Lemon test.14
In his dissent, Justice Brennan severely criticized the majority for ignor-
ing the "formal 'tests' that have traditionally structured [the Court's] in-
131. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 1161 (1982) (law which granted
churches veto power over liquor license applications had the secular purpose of insulating
churches from undesirable neighbors, but churches could favor members of their congregation,
thereby advancing religion).
132. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
133. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
134. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
135. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615; Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
136. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (political divisiveness created along
religious lines by direct subsidy to a religious institution). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984) (political divisiveness created by lawsuit itself is not sufficient; a history of political
divisiveness as a result of government action must exist).
137. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 403.
138. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (challenge to Minnesota income tax
deduction primarily benefiting those with children in parochial schools); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (challenge to tax credits for
parents of parochial school children); Hurt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (challenge to
issue of revenue bonds to assist Baptist college).
139. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
140. Id. at 790.
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quiry under the Establishment Clause ... ."141
One year later, the Supreme Court superficially returned to the
Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly. 42 However, Chief Justice Burger, cit-
ing Marsh and "emphasizing [the Court's] unwillingness to be confined
to any single test or criterion,"' 43 clearly indicated that the law today
involves both a Lemon analysis and an historical tradition test.
2. De Jure Diplomatic Relations with the Holy See and the Establishment
Clause
a. Application of the Three Prong Lemon Test
The challenged government action in Americans United easily
would have passed the first prong of the Lemon test. Numerous secular
purposes exist for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Holy
See.
One of the Reagan Administration's paramount purposes is to tap
the influence and experience of the Holy See in opposing Communism.144
President Truman recognized the Holy See's influence on communist ac-
tivities in the early 1950's. Citing the need to counter the threat of Com-
munism as his primary secular purpose, President Truman
unsuccessfully sought to transform the government's then de facto recog-
nition of the Holy See into de jure recognition.'45 Similarly, the Reagan
Administration views the Holy See, currently led by an anti-Communist
Polish Pontiff, as a powerful ally for combating the perceived threat of
worldwide Communist influence. 146 This is a clearly secular foreign pol-
icy objective and is therefore valid under the Lemon test.
Obtaining intelligence information is also a valid secular purpose.
The Holy See's active and sophisticated foreign service exercises consid-
erable influence throughout the world and has access to intelligence in-
formation of great political value to the United States.147 The strategic
location of the Vatican in the heart of Europe and the Church's intimate
contact with most of the peoples of the world, especially those behind the
Iron Curtain and in the Third World, make the Holy See an ideal "listen-
ing post."'' 48
Finally, the Holy See has continuously served as a diplomatic cham-
141. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
143. Id. at 679.
144. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, at 310-12; Bettwy & Sheehan, supra note 23, at 17-18;
Bettwy, supra note 20, at 258; Note, supra note 12, at 215. But see L. PFEFFER, supra note 33,
at 312-14 (arguments refuting the Holy See's ability to counter Communism and provide valu-
able intelligence information).
145. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
147. See sources cited supra note 144.
148. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, at 311. But see L. PFEFFER, supra note 33, at 313-14.
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pion of peace, human rights and political freedom.149 The Holy See has
explicitly stated that it "wishes to remain and will remain extraneous to
all from the temporal competitions between States and to international
Congresses held for such objects, unless the parties make concordant ap-
peal to its peaceful mission .... President Roosevelt recognized the
Holy See's dedication to peace, human rights and freedom during the
1930's and during the Second World War. He found this dedication suf-
ficient to justify reestablishing reciprocal de facto relations with the Holy
See in 1937.151
Thus, the United States has at least three secular purposes which
meet the first requirement of the Lemon test. Furthermore, the blatantly
spiritual goals of the Holy See in establishing de jure relations with the
United States 152 are irrelevant to the analysis under the first prong of
Lemon. The first prong of the Lemon test refers only to the govern-
ment's purpose; it does not apply to the purposes of the religious entity.
Similarly, the primary effect which establishing diplomatic relations
with the Holy See would have on the advancement or inhibition of reli-
gion would not necessarily render these relations unconstitutional. The
plaintiffs in Americans United contended that diplomatic relations with
the Holy See would place the Church on a different footing with the
federal government than other denominations and thereby unconstitu-
tionally advance the status of the Church in the United States.153 How-
ever, distinguishing historical realities from a legally-defined relationship
is difficult. The Church is an international organization formed around
spiritual principles. Its leader is recognized both as a political sovereign
and as a moral authority. Because of these facts, the Church does stand
on a different footing from other denominations that do not have the
secular autonomy created by the Vatican.
Within the United States, the status of the Holy See is determined
by its unique international position and not by the United States' de jure
recognition of the Holy See. The United States gives de jure recognition
to other countries that have leaders who function in the dual role of secu-
lar and religious sovereign. 154 Theoretically, if other religious denomina-
149. See supra note 144.
150. Treaty of the Lateran, supra note 14, art. 24.
151. See sources cited supra notes 37-42.
152. The dual nature of the Holy See allows the tiny Vatican City to serve as a stepping
stone for the world wide spiritual organization of the Catholic Church. Thus, by establishing
official diplomatic relations with the United States, the Holy See is attempting to fulfill its
spiritual policy objective of carrying its faith throughout the world. See supra notes 13-19 and
accompanying text.
153. 786 F.2d at 197-98, 200-201. See also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
154. For example, Queen Elizabeth II is both ruler of the United Kingdom and titular head
of the Anglican Church. Boston Globe, Sept. 13, 1979, at 12, col. 1-2. In recent years, many
former political leaders have also held religious positions. For example, President William
Tolbert of Liberia was a Baptist minister. NEWSWEEK, Apr. 21, 1980, at 63. Former Prime
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tions developed secular autonomy similar to that of the Holy See, the
United States would recognize them as well, assuming that sufficient for-
eign policy objectives existed for according recognition. De jure recogni-
tion of the Holy See has not significantly altered the international
diplomatic status the Holy See held when the United States recognized it
in only a de facto manner.'
55
The spiritual objectives of the Holy See in establishing official diplo-
matic ties with the United States do not affect a constitutional analysis of
the primary effect of the relations.' 56 While establishment of official dip-
lomatic relations clearly has the effect of furthering the spiritual goals of
the Holy See, its primary effect is to promote the secular foreign policy
goals of the United States and the Holy See. 57 Since the United States
deals with the Holy See only in its secular role as head of the Vatican,
such government action neither advances nor inhibits religion.158
The final "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test presents
the most difficult obstacle to de jure recognition of the Holy See. Ini-
tially, the unique dual nature of the Holy See suggests significant entan-
glement between the United States and the Catholic Church. Therefore,
a constitutional analysis of the actual entanglement involves a weighing
and balancing of the four factors announced by the Court in Lemon.
While the United States established relations with the secular entity
of the Vatican City and not with the Church, 1 59 the overall nature of the
Holy See is unquestionably pervasively religious. Assessment of this par-
ticular factor clearly favors a finding of entanglement. Thus, it is partic-
ularly important to analyze the three remaining factors in order to decide
whether excessive entanglement exists.
Regarding the second and third factors of the excessive entangle-
ment analysis, some commentators argue that the diplomatic relationship
requires official continuing surveillance and thus by its very nature cre-
ates excessive entanglement. 160 Proponents of this argument misunder-
stand the modern realities surrounding the diplomatic relationship.
Minister of Zimbabwe, Abel Muzorewa, is also a bishop. TIME, Mar. 3, 1980, at 39. Finally,
dejure relations existed between the United States and Iran until the 1979 hostage fiasco in the
American Embassy in Tehran. At that time, the Ayatollah Khomeini served as both the ruler
of Iran and as a Shi'ite Imam. TIME, Jan. 7, 1980, at 13.
155. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 13-19, 152 and accompanying text.
157. Other foreign governments have not been blind to the foreign policy benefits that can
be achieved by establishing diplomatic relations with the Holy See. The Polish government is
presently exploring the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the Holy See in an
attempt to achieve greater legitimacy abroad and within its predominantly Catholic popula-
tion. L.A. Times, June 15, 1987, at 6, col. 2.
158. 130 CONG. REC. S2385 (Mar. 7, 1984).
159. 130 CONG. REC. S2387 (Mar. 7, 1984).
160. See Note, supra note 12, at 216 (citing G. STUART, AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND
CONSULAR PRACTICE 59, 123 (1952)) (administrative entanglement results from the exchange
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Under the theory of personal representation, a diplomatic agent is
the personification of his sovereign state, whose independence must be
respected.161 Diplomatic premises have the status of foreign territory,162
and the diplomatic agent is permitted freedom of movement and commu-
nication, as well as immunity from local jurisdiction, in order to carry
out effective diplomatic relations.163 The 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Immunities reaffirms these diplomatic privileges. Article 41
of the Treaty expressly states that diplomatic missions "have a duty not
to interfere in the internal affairs of the [receiving] State .... 
The principles of independence and sovereignty underlying the dip-
lomatic relationship serve to reduce entanglement of administrative agen-
cies and to avoid creation of such entanglement. The strict codes and
rules of such relations preclude continuing official surveillance. Thus,
unregulated de facto relations would result in greater entanglement than
highly structured, official de jure relations. The entanglement that re-
sults from de facto recognition is evidenced by the confusing United
States-Holy See relations prior to 1984.165
Finally, under the fourth excessive entanglement factor, the exist-
ence of a suit challenging the government's actions suggests a risk of
political divisiveness developing along religious lines. 166 However, polit-
ical divisiveness created by a lawsuit itself does not constitute entangle-
ment; rather, a history of political divisiveness as a result of government
action must exist. 167
A history of political divisiveness due to government relations with
the Holy See does exist.168 The non-Catholic American population has
long perceived the Holy See as a powerful threat to the secular autonomy
of the federal government. This political discord and religious prejudice
has been powerful enough in the past consistently to block de jure
relations. 169
of embassies, diplomatic staffs, documents, communications and security forces). See also
supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
161. C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 1 (1967).
162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. at 17.
164. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, art. 41, para. 1, 500 U.N.T.S.
95.
165. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text. De facto recognition of the Holy See
could present a stronger establishment clause argument, based upon the Lemon test, than de
jure recognition. When the President sends a personal representative to the Holy See, there is
no way to verify that such a representative is fulfilling a purely secular role. In addition, a
complaint based on this relationship could never surmount the Article III hurdles of standing
and the political question doctrine.
166. See supra note 136.
167. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See supra note 136.
168. See supra notes 32-46, 136 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
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However, anti-Catholic sentiment appears to have subsided in re-
cent decades. Productive relations with the Holy See throughout the last
half-century, the presidency of Catholic John F. Kennedy, and the Holy
See's peacekeeping role in international affairs have helped calm the fears
of the non-Catholic populace. The senatorial consent to the presidential
appointment and the congressional allocation of funds indicate that mini-
mal political disharmony was provoked by the federal government ac-
tion. Political divisiveness is a result of the alignment of the public on a
specific issue. If the issue is resolved by de jure recognition, no future
alignment will occur. Furthermore, if the political divisiveness directly
results from anti-Catholic sentiment, such prejudice should not be a fac-
tor in determining the outcome of an establishment clause analysis.
An analysis of the above four factors in light of the excessive entan-
glement test suggests a close decision. No one factor is determinative; 170
the four factors collectively describe a highly complex relationship be-
tween the American government and a unique political-religious entity.
However, based upon the foregoing analysis, the establishment of official
diplomatic relations with the Holy See should withstand the Lemon
three-pronged neutrality test.
b. Application of the Historical Tradition Test
The historical tradition test articulated by Chief Justice Burger in
Marsh v. Chambers17 1 provides little constitutional guidance. The Chief
Justice stated: "Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify con-
temporary violations of constitutional guarantees ... In this context,
historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended
the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that
Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress .... "172
This reasoning offers little more than a circular analysis.
The history of the United States-Holy See relations reveals decades
of de facto indirect attempts, through consular, non-reciprocal, and unof-
ficial relations, to accomplish what the Reagan administration has di-
rectly accomplished through official de jure reciprocal diplomatic
relations with the Holy See. 173 Indirect relations were developed histori-
cally for various political reasons, including anti-Catholic bigotry. That
these relations may have been due in part to attempts at circumventing
the Establishment Clause does not indicate present constitutional validity
or invalidity. The Establishment Clause is better served by the three-
pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.
170. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
171. 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983).
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
The unique status of the Holy See as both a spiritual and secular
sovereignty creates difficult questions concerning the constitutionality of
establishment of de jure diplomatic relations between the United States
and the Holy See. The requirements of standing and the political ques-
tion doctrine make adjudication of the establishment clause issues prob-
lematical. The unique political-religious nature of the Holy See further
complicates the application of establishment clause jurisprudence.
To achieve de jure diplomatic relations with the Holy See, the
United States must comply with all requirements of the law,174 including
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Americans United repre-
sents an attempt by dissenting citizens to ascertain whether de jure rela-
tions currently exist between the United States and the Holy See.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined to answer this urgent and
unique question on behalf of the Constitution and the federal govern-
ment. While the existing diplomatic relations between the United States
and the Holy See meet all the requirements of the Lemon test,'75 the
Supreme Court's silence casts a shadow over their de jure status.
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